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CASE NOTES
as her husband, and husband and wife must be treated as separate entities.
The dissent strongly urged that law enforcement in conspiracy must con-
sider the confidential relationship of marriage, and that the rejection of
the common-law rule endangers such relationship.' 9 The dissenting
opinion further charged that only Congress should, if it so desires, dismiss
such a well established rule.20 The majority of the Court stated, on the
other hand, that it would be false to imply that Congress intended to
retain the common-law doctrine in light of the present status of married
women.
Recent English and Canadian decisions have retained the common-law
rule. In Kowbel v. The Queen,21 the court held that such a well estab-
lished rule should not be judicially repealed. 22 The Privy Council, in
Mawji v. The Queen,23 simply stated that the common-law rule was still
retained. Apparently consideration was not given to the increased rights
of women.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Dege case has these effects: (1)
It settles the conflicting lower federal court decisions; (2) it will be a
binding authority on future federal decisions applying federal conspiracy
law; and (3) the decision is persuasive authority for the basis of future
state decisions. But the ultimate effect of this decision is to increase mar-
ried women's liabilities by refusing to recognize certain feudal notions
concerning coverture and criminal responsibility.
19 For discussion of the contrary view see Williams, Legal Unity of Husband and
WVife, 10 MODERN L. REv. 16-21 (1947).
20 Accord, Dawson v. United States, 10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S.
687 (1926).
21 110 Can. Cr. Cas. 47, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1954).
22 Contra, dissent in the Kowbel case, 4 D.L.R. at 344.
41 Crim. App. R. 69, 1 All E.R. 385 (Privv Council, 1957).
EVIDENCE-WIFE MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY
AGAINST HUSBAND
The defendant was indicted under the White Slave Traffic Act (more
commonly known as the Mann Act),' for knowingly transporting his
wife in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution. Defendant
was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Alabama; the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court, on
certiorari, affirmed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court
1 18 U.S.C.A. 5 2421 (Supp. 1959),
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held that this case was within the recognized exception that certain
kinds of offenses committed by a party against his spouse will prevent
the party from exercising the privilege of excluding the spouse's adverse
testimony, and that the spouse may be compelled to testify even over
her own objection. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
The common-law rule is that one spouse cannot testify against the
other.2 The courts have recognized an exception to this rule however, as
indicated above in the holding of the Supreme Court in Wyatt. By this
exception if one spouse is injured by the other, he or she may testify
against the offending party. This was brought out at least as early as 1631
in Lord Audley's Case,3 where the husband had instigated another to rape
his wife, and the court allowed her to testify against him. The federal
courts of appeal have almost unanimously held that Mann Act prosecu-
tions, where the wife is the victim, are within this exception.4 Actually,
only one federal court has held contrary,5 and this decision has been
specifically reversed.6 But it should be noted that in the Wyatt case a
federal court held for the first time that a wife can be compelled to
testify against her husband over her objections.7
The Court in the Wyatt case justified its decision on the basis that the
legislative intent underlying the Mann Act was to protect from them-
selves, the women with whom it sought to deal-i.e., women who had no
independent will of their own. In reaching their decision, the Court
almost completely ignored the main rationale in Havkins v. United
States,- where the wife of the defendant was not allowed to testify
against her husband in a Mann Act prosecution. Two factual differences
2 United States v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949); Brunner v. United States,
168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948); Paul v. United States, 79 F. 2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935); Stein v.
Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
:1 3 How. St. Tr. 401 (1631).
4 Shores v. United States, 174 F. 2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); Hayes v. United States, 168 F.
2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Levine v. United States, 163 F. 2d 992 (5th Cir. 1947); United
States v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943); Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463
(5th Cir. 1918); Pappas v. United States, 241 Fed. 665 (9th Cir. 1917); Cohen v. United
States, 214 Fed. 23 (9th Cir. 1914).
Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915).
'Shores v. United States, 174 F. 2d 838 (8th Cit. 1949).
In the Shores case, supra note 6, the court did state that a wife may be compelled to
testify against her husband; this statement, however, only constituted dictum. The exact
words of the court were: "Nor does the fact that appellant's wife stated on the stand
that she did not wish to testify against her husband in any way affect the situation. As a
matter of fact, she did not refuse to testify, so as to require the'court to compel her to do
so, but, even if she had, this would have made no difference." Shores v. United States,
supra at 841.
3 58 U.S. 74 (1958):
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in Hawkins should be noted, however; in opposition to the Wyatt case:
(1) The wife was willing to testify, although she was not allowed to do
so; and (2) she was not the victim. But although the factual situations
in Hawkins and Wyatt are not exactly alike, it would still seem that the
following rationale of the Hawkins Court is applicable to Wyatt:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband
against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a
policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband,
wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as well. Such a belief has
never been unreasonable and is not now.9
The majority opinion in Wyatt barely mentioned the importance of
the marriage relationship, but did find that the need for evidence is suf-
ficient to justify compelling a wife to testify against her husband. It
would seem that by not discussing the importance of maintaining the
conjugal relationship the court was relegating it to a subordinate position
in the realm of public policy. If the reasoning of the Hawkins case is
losing its force, as the Wyatt decision would seem to indicate, then the
door would now appear to be open for allowing one spouse to testify
over the other's objections in all cases, and even perhaps for compelling
such testimony.10
Thereasoning in the Wyatt decision appears to be in conformity with
the following remark in the comment to rule 215 of the Model Code of
Evidence: 11
It is now generally agreed that these considerations [i.e., the necessity of pro-
tecting the family tranquility and safeguarding the confidential relationship
between husband and wife] cannot justify the disqualification of a spouse as
a witness or a privilege either in the witness-spouse to refuse to testify or in the
party-spouse to prevent the other spouse from testifying.12
It might also be noted that the American Bar Association has recom-
mended that the privilege protecting husband and wife from being called
as witnesses against each other be abolished, in both civil and criminal
11 Id. at 77.
10 Yoder v. United States, 80 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935), went so far as to hold that a
spouse may testify over her husband's objections in a Mann Act prosecution even
though she was not the victim; the decision in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74
(1958), however, negated this result.
11 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 215 (1942). Rule 215 deals with the disclosure of
confidential communication between husband and wife, rather than the specific point
involved in the Wyatt case, but in the abovementioned statement in the comment to the
rule, one finds a thought which seems particularly worthy of noting in connection with
Vyatt.
12 MODEL CODE OF EVDENCE rule 215, comment, at 154 (1942).
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cases.' 3 Another advocate for the abolition of the privilege is Professor
Vigmore, who has stated:
This privilege has no longer any good reason for retention.... [T]his marital
privilege is the merest anachronism, in legal theory, and an indefensible obstruc-
tion to truth, in practice.1 4
Thus the Wyatt case would seem to follow the view of those who pro-
pose a change in the rule of evidence concerning marital testimony.
1- 63 A.B.A. REP. 594 (1938).
1 4 8 AVWG MORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 232 (3d ed. 1940).
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CAN
TRANSFER ACTION UNDER SECTION 1404 (a) ONLY
TO DISTRICT WITH STATUTORY VENUE
Respondents Blaski and others were the original plaintiffs in a patent
infringement action brought in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas against defendants, who were residents of the
City of Dallas, where they maintained their only place of business and
wvhere the alleged acts of infringement occurred. Defendants moved, un-
der section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code,' to transfer the action to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They
asserted that such transfer would be for the convenience of the parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, inasmuch as litigation with regard
to the same patent was already pending in the Illinois District Court be-
tween the same plaintiffs and other alleged infringers. At the time of filing
their motion the defendants waived all objections to the venue of the Il-
linois District Court if their motion to transfer were granted.
The Texas District Court granted the motion over the objection of the
plaintiffs who, relying on the specific venue section regarding civil ac-
tions for patent infringements, 2 insisted that the Illinois District Court
was not a district "where the action might have been brought" within the
meaning of section 1404(a). Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a petition
for a writ of mandamus directing the vacation of the transfer order was
denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.3
1 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (a) (Supp. 1959). Change of venue-"(a) For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (b) (Supp. 1959). Patents and copyrights-"(b) Any civil action
for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant re-
sides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringenent and has a regular and
established place of business."
3 Ex parte Blaski, 245 F. 2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957).
